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1. Introduction 
From the perspective of the agency theory, managers could be opportunistic by choosing accounting policies using 
their discretion to manipulate accounting income to optimize their benefits (Healy, 1985). Section 359: 3-4 of 
CAMA (2004) requires firms to establish an audit committee to safeguard the corporate accounting decision 
process to protect the interests of shareholders. The committee became a listing requirement in 1990 (CAMA, 
2004) and the SEC code of 2011 institutionalized its independence with independent directors to foster effective 
monitoring. The independence of the audit committee came under attack for inadequate oversight in recent years in 
Nigeria (Chukwunedu, Ogochukwu and Chiedu, 2015). An independent audit committee is required to effectively 
protect the interests of shareholders from the managers. According to Carcello and Neal (2003) and Poretti, Schatt 
and Bruynseels (2018), the effectiveness of the audit committee depends majorly on its independence.The 
composition of the committee assumes a critical role assessing the quality of its monitoring of the accounting policy 
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decision process. The code of corporate governance requires that independent directors should compose half of the 
committee membership (SEC, 2011). It is hypothesized in this study that higher proportions of the independent 
directors in the committeewouldsupport effective monitoring of theaccounting policy decisions of the firms to 
ensure that the incentives behind the selections of the methods are in the interest of the shareholders. 
 
The audit committee started as a part of corporate governance mechanism in the US in the late 1930s (Bealing, 
Nelson and Staley, 2006) and became a listing requirement in 1972 (Fitchtner, 2010). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
bolstered itsinstitutionalization (Naciri, 2008). However, Menon and Williams (1994) observed that most firms do 
not rely on the committee to stimulate the eminence of the financial reporting process. Accounting policy choice is 
a discretion in the reporting permitted within GAAP (Bagnoli and Watts, 2005).Top management deploy this 
latitude to reduce the constraints imposed by their agency contracts in particular where managerial compensations 
are tied to reported income (Warfield, Wild and Wild, 1995). However, wherethe incentives of managerscoincide 
with the owners’then accounting policy decisions would create information asymmetry and influence stock returns 
(Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith, 1982; Fields, Lys, and Vincent, 2001). The need to meet up withand protect the 
interests of the firm’s stakeholders serves as a singificant incentive to accounting policy decisions (Ndjetcheu, 
2012). Managers used their discretion in accounting policy decisions to managethe expectations of stakeholders 
with implicit claims (Bowen DuCharme and Shores (1995).A bonus plan compensation scheme is not popular 
among Nigerian listed firms.Therefore, managers’ incentives for accounting choice would be for other purposes, 
such as managerial reputation and job security rather than financial compensation. Still, managers could be 
opportunistic in their choice of the accounting method because the impact is commensurate with that of the bonus 
plan. 
 
The discretionof managers in accounting choice usually could be in the decisions to use either fair-value or cost 
methodin reporting economics events of firms (Cairns et al. 2011). These measurements have different effects on 
the reported income and the prediction of the firm’s future operating cash flows (Holthausen, 1990; Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999; Beneish, 2001). Some of these latitudes are found in International Accounting Standards (IAS)2, 
16,38 and 40 forthe measurementsof inventory, property, plant and equipment, intangible assets and investment 
property respectively. Nigerian firms started using international standards to prepare financial statements since 
2010 and managers utilize this discretion for opportunistic purposes. Independent audit committeesare considered 
the ultimate mechanisms to ensure that managers are better monitored on this discretion (Klein, 2002; DeZoort, et 
al., 2002). Accounting policy decisions need to be closely monitored as they have similar objectives as the earnings 
management (Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith, 1982; Fields, Lysand Vincent, 2001). However, the independence of 
the audit committee in Nigeria does not support effective monitoring on firms’ accounting process (Moses,2016; 
Oliver and Grace, 2017) and the management of the firms could use their discretion against the interest of the 
shareholders.  
 
Fields, Lysand Vincent (2001) noted that studies (such as Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith, 1982; Bowen DuCharme 
and Shores, 1995; Astami and Tower, 2006; Dey, Grinyerand Sinclair, 2008; Waweru, Ntui and Mangena, 2011; 
Isa, 2014) did not include the influence of the auditing process on accounting policy decisions.This has left out an 
important variable in the literature of accounting choice. According to Parker (1997) and Abbott and Parker (2000), 
there is growing evidence that the independence of an audit committee is vital to mitigating the adverse 
consequences of managers’ discretions and the manipulations of the accounting process. The objectives of the study 
are, first, to examine the nature of accounting policy decisions of the firms and, second, to examine the effects of an 
independent audit committee on a firm’s accounting policy decisions to provide the basis for assessing the relevant 
corporate governance code that affects audit committee independence. To the best of the knowledge of the 
researcher, the predictive capacity of the audit committee’s independence on accounting policy decisions is yet to 
be addressed in any study.  The next part of the paper presents the literature review, part three reports the research 
design, part four presents the results and discussions and, lastly, part five reports the summary and conclusions. 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Accounting Policy Decisions 
Accounting policy decisions would have income-increasing or income-decreasing effects on the firm’s reported 
income permissive within the prescribed methods that lead to inefficient contracting (Bowen DuCharme and 
Shores, 1995; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Fields, Lys and Vincent, 2001; Francis, 2001). According to Isa 
(2014), Nigerian firms used accounting policies that increase their reported income.  
 
Journal of Accounting and Finance in Emerging Economies     Vol. 5, No 2, 2019 
 
 
205 
 
 
The incentive to choice income increasing methods is then derived by the need to: increase managerial 
compensation, particularly when tied to reported income, avoid firms’ violating debt covenants and reduce their 
political costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978 and 1990). The bonus-plan and debt violation explanations do not 
apply to the Nigerian business environment. Ndjetcheu (2012) argued that firms in the Sub-Saharan Africa select 
accounting policies that reduce the tax burden, consistent with Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981). There are other 
implicit incentive obligations to the firms that could apply to Nigeria discovered to be associated with accounting 
policy decisions (Bowen DuCharme and Shores, 1995; Jackson, Xiaotao and Cecchini, 2009). These include labour 
intensity in organizations and continuous patronage of short-term creditors and the suppliers of inputs. The 
concentration of ownership and owner-control boards also predicts the decisions on which accounting policy to 
adopt by firms (Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith, 1982; Dhaliwal and Schepanski, 1984; Astami and Tower, 2006; 
Isa, 2014). Whichever incentives derive management decisions on accounting policies in Nigeria, company law 
requires audit committees to scrutinize their appropriateness before the financial statements are finalized and the 
oversight could only be effective with the independence of the committee.  
  
2.2 Audit Committee Independence and Accounting Policy Decisions  
According to the agency theory, managers would always try to achieve this purpose given their discretion in 
selecting accounting policies (Healy, 1995). Audit committees should be composed of competent members with the 
authority and the resources to secure shareholders’ interests against managerial manipulations of accounting 
methods for personal gain (DeZoort et al., 2002). The code 2011 requires half of the committee’s membership 
(three independent directors) to make the six-man committee independent. Audit committee independence is 
considered critical to its effective oversight functions (Poretti, Schatt and Bruynseels, 2018). Thus, a higher 
presence of outsiders in the committee increases its level of independence andthe ability to check the CEOs and 
prevent managerial opportunism. The results of Cacello and Neal (2000) support the idea that the audit committee 
should comprise entirely independent directors. Abbott, Parkand Parker(2002) found that audit committees 
composed of outsider directors are likely to safeguard the integrity of the financial reporting process.  
 
Studies such as Cacello and Neal (2000) and Li, Lin and Yang (2006) found that audit committee independence 
was not significant in securing the interests of shareholders in the latitudes accounting process provided for 
managers. However, Abbott and Park (2000), Anderson, Mansi and Rebb (2004), Sharma and Chunli (2014), 
Soliman and Ragab (2014), Oliver and Grace (2017), Musa, Oloruntoba and Oba (2014), Ayemere and Elijah 
(2015),Chandrasegaram et al. (2013), Hamdan, Mushtaha and Al-Sartawi (2013), Salleh and Haat (2014), 
Wiralestari and Tanzil (2015), Kamolsakulchai (2015) and Habib and Bhuiyan, 2016) foundcontrary evidence. The 
evidence has been mixed across countries depending on the institutional enforcements of each country. In countries 
where there are stronger institutions, the functions of audit committees are enhanced and also their ability to fulfill 
their obligations becomes much easier (Cacello and Neal, 2003). Nigeria belongs to a group of LDC countries 
categorized with weak institutional enforcement.  
  
2.3 Audit Committee Monitoring and Financial Reporting Process  
Cacello and Neal (2003) found that an independent audit committee reduces the risk of corporate failure. Menon 
and Williams(1994) posed that most firms just comply with the legal requirement but not because they are 
performing their expected roles. In Nigeria, the audit committees monitoring performance could be considered as 
ineffective and the committee a mere legal compliance. For instance, Chukwunedu et al. (2015) showed that audit 
committees are faced with practical and legal constraints that have adversely affected their ability to adequately 
monitor the accounting process. Professional accounting bodies and the public are wary of the committees reports. 
The committee enjoys inadequate managerial backing with inconsequential faith, fewer responsibilities and 
unwilling respect (Atu, 2014).  
 
Studies such as Bala (2014) and Isa and Farouk (2018) in Nigeria discovered that committees have been effective in 
their monitoring role, but much is left to be desired on their independence. To make the committee more 
independent and effective in monitoring, the drafted Nigeria Code of Corporate Governance (NCCG), which 
becomes effective by January 2020, proposed that the committee composed of only independent directors. Prior 
studies such asBowen DuCharme and Shores(1995), Astami and Tower (2006), Dey, Grinyer and Sinclair (2008), 
Jackson, Xiaotao and Cecchini (2009), Waweru, Ntui and Mangena(2011),Isa (2014) and Acaranupong (2017) in 
the literature of accounting choice did not examine the independence of the audit committee as a predictor of the 
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accounting policy decisions of firms. This study tests the significance of audit committee independence on 
accounting policy decisions within this context to validate the proposition of the agency theory. 
 
3. Research Design 
Fifty-eight firms from the 114 non-financial firms listed on the NSE were studied from2012-2016. The data were 
extracted from the financial statements. A model similar to Bowen, DuCharme and Shores (1995) and Jackson, 
Xiaotao and Cecchini (2009) was modified and adapted to assess the predictors of the audit committee 
independence on firms’ accounting policy decisions. The model specification is: 
 
APC = β0 +β1ACIit +β2BCMit +β3LEVit +β4FSZit +β5PRTit +β6LBRit +β7TAXit + β8STCit +β9SPLit + εit 
  
APCit is a dependent variable that represents the accounting policy decisions of firms. It is the ratio of the 
accounting policies of assets, which have the effects of increasing the reported income over the total assets 
accounting policies adopted and disclosed by the firms (Waweru, Ntui and Mangena, 2011). In this study, only the 
accounting policies on assets were considered because they provided widely used managerial discretion for 
accounting choice used in Nigeria. ACIit is an explanatory variable that represents the audit independence 
committee. It is measured as the natural log of the numbers of the committee, who represent shareholders over the 
number of members, who represent directors (Isa and Farouk, 2018). There is growing evidence on the association 
of audit committee effectiveness and its oversight on the firm’s accounting process (Parker, 1997; Abbott and 
Parker, 2000). This justifies the choice of the ACIit as an explanatory variable on the accounting policy decisions of 
firms.  
 
The explanatory variables in the model include the traditional predictors of accounting policy decisions of firms 
used by previous studies, such as Bowen, DuCharme and Shores (1995), Astami and Tower (2001), Jackson, Liu 
and Cecchini (2009), Waweru, Ntui and Mangena (2011) and Isa (2014). These include: FSZit that represents the 
size of the firm which is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total sales; LEVit represents the leverage 
of the firm and is measured as the ratio of the long-term borrowings to the shareholders’ equity (0 if long-term 
borrowing is missing). And PRTit represents the profitability of the firm which is measured as the ratio of net 
income to adjusted total assets. BCMit represents board independence and is found significant in Waweru, Ntui and 
Mangena (2011) and Isa (2014).It is measured as the ratio of non-executive directors to the size of the board. The 
other category of traditional predictor variables for stakeholder expectations are based on party implicit 
claims: STCit represents creditors' expectations; it is measured as the ratio of short-term borrowings to equity; 
CGSit represents suppliers' expectations; it is measured as the natural logarithm of the cost of sales scaled by 
adjusted total assets. LBRit represents employee expectations; it is measured as one minus the ratio of gross PP and 
E to adjusted total assets (Bowen, DuCharme and Shores, 1995; Jackson, Xiaotao and Cecchini, 2009; Waweru, 
Ntui and Mangena, 2011; Ndjetcheu, 2012) and TAXit represent government expectations; it is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the accrued tax expenses scaled by adjusted total assets (Ndjetcheu, 2012). 
 
4. Results and Discussions 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. APCit, (accounting policy decision) has a mean of 0.74.This 
implies that the firms averagely choose income increasing policies. The mean of ACIit is 2.74. This implies that the 
average outsiders in the committees are slightly below the required minimum. Further description of the 
composition of the audit committee’s independence is reported in Table 2. The average value of the firms’ size 
(FSZit) is $117.10 with a standard deviation of $201.96. These are accompanied by  amaximum observation of 
$1,081 billion and a minimum less than $0.07 billion. These indicate greater variability among the firms because 
they are drawn from the various subsectors of the manufacturing sector. 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Stdev Min Max 
APC 290 0.74 0.18 .25 1.00 
BCM 290 0.66 0.17 0.00 1.00 
FSZ (billion $) 290 117.10 201.96 0.07 1,081.15 
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This Table presents the description statistics of the study variables. 
 
Table 2 presents the frequencies of the number of independent directors in the audit committee. The number of 
outsiders who represent shareholders in the committee among the firms ranges from 1 to 5 among the committees. 
It is revealed that about 26% of the audit committees had 2 outsiders. This is less than the benchmark of three 
outsiders prescribed by the code. However, about 72% of the committees had three outsiders as members which 
comply with the Code. Furthermore, it is discovered that only 1% and 0.4% of the audit committees had 4 and 5 
outsiders respectively, which implies the highest level of independence. It could be stated that the majority of the 
audit committees enjoyed the purported amount of independence. These results imply significant compliance with 
the provisions of the Code.  
 
 Table 2: Frequency of Outsiders in Audit Committee 
 
This Table presents the frequencies of ACs outsiders, meetings and membership vis-à-vis the statutory benchmark. 
 
4.2 Accounting Policy Choice Decisions 
Table 3 presents the count of accounting policy decisions of the sampled firms on accounting policy on property, 
plant and equipment (PPE), goodwill (GDWL), software (SFTW), inventory (INVT), investment property (INVP) 
and depreciation methods (DEPM). From the results, the firms adopted the cost method (income increasing policy) 
87% for PPE, 53% for GDWL, 94% for SFTW and 57% for INVP of the decisions. All the decisions on the 
depreciation method by the firms favoured a straight-line method. Bowen,DuCharme and Shores (1995), Astami 
and Tower (2206) and Waweru, Ntui and Mangena (2011) classified the straight-line method as income increasing. 
It is discovered that 71% of the policy decisions on INVT was the average cost method. Bowen, DuCharme and 
Shores (1995) considered the straight-line method as an intermediate policy (between FIFO (income increasing) 
and LIFO (income decreasing). The results further indicate that the fair-value (income decreasing) method was not 
favoured by the policy decisions of the firms; they adopted only 5% and 6% of the decisions for PPE and SFTW, 
respectively. However, the policy was adopted for GDWL 47%. 
  
LEV 290 0.27 0.51 0.00 5.17 
PRT 290 0.07 0.14 -0.39 0.79 
SPL (billion $) 290 81.00 134.00 0.12 621.00 
LBR 290 0.56 0.25 0.00 1.00 
STC 290 0.13 0.15 0.00 0.82 
ACI 290 2.74 0.51 1.00 5.00 
TAX 290 16.43 7.93 25.27 0.00 
Number of Outsiders 2012 % 2013 % 2014 % 2015 % 2016 % Mean (%) 
1 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.014 
2 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.256 
3 0.72 0.74 0.68 0.72 0.72 0.716 
4 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.010 
5 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.004 
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Overall, it is discovered that an average of 69% of the firms’ decisions favoured the income increasing policies, 
29% of the decision adopted the income decreasing methods and 2% adopted mixed policies. This implies that 
firms predominantly used income increasing policies. This is consistent with the finding of Bowen,DuCharme and 
Shores (1995), Astami and Tower (2006), Waweru, Ntui and Mangena (2011) and Isa (2014). 
 
Table 3: Accounting Policy Decisions of Firms 
 
 Disclosure Income 
increasing 
Income 
decreasing 
Mixed 
Depreciation Method 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Property, Plant and Equipment 1.00 0.87 0.05 0.08 
Goodwill 0.16 0.53 0.47 0.00 
Intangible Assets Software 0.64 0.94 0.06 0.00 
Inventory 1.00 0.23 0.71 0.06 
Investment Property 0.26 0.57 0.43 0.00 
Mean 0.68 0.69 0.29 0.02 
 
This Table presents the distribution of decision on accounting methods made by firms between 2012-2016.  
  
4.3 Analysis of the Regression Results 
Table 4 presents a summary of the regression results. The Adjusted R2 indicates that 24.83% of the changes in 
accounting policy decisions are explained by the variables composed in the model, which is higher than the 
moderate value of 19% suggested by Chin (1998). The F-ratio is 11.61 along with a p-value of 0.0000. This 
indicates that the model is significant and good for estimating the incentives for accounting policy decisions of 
firms. Several tests were conducted to ensure that the assumptions of regression analysis were not violated. For 
instance, the constant variance assumption was tested using Breusch-Pagan and the null hypothesis was not support 
(chi-square = 1.80, p-value = 0.1792) which indicates that heteroskedasticity is not a problem. Skewness/Kurtosis 
tests for the normality test was conducted and the results indicated that data were normally distributed (the joint 
chi-square = 2.92, p-value = 0.2327. The variance inflation factor test showed a Mean VIF 1.69 (maximum of 2.60 
for TAXit and minimum of 1.08 for BCMit). According to Craney and Surles (2002), no formal criteria exists for 
deciding if VIF is too large, but a value greater than 10 indicates a strong presence of multicollinearity that requires 
remedial measures. There were very few outliers outside the threshold of ±2 based on studentized residuals analysis 
which were not significant. 
 
From the Table, it is discovered that ACIit, is not significant (t-statistics = 0.63, p-value = 0.526). This implies that 
the audit committee’s independence level does not ensure effective incentive monitoring on the accounting policy 
decisions of the management. This result is inconsistent with the findings of Abbott and Park (2000) which states 
that firms with independent audit committees are more vigilant and ensure the objectivity and integrity of the 
accounting process. Contrary to Carcello and Neal’s (2003) and Poretti, Schatt and Bruynseels’ (2018) results, the 
findings did not validate the agency theory perspective that the presence of an independent audit committee would 
improve monitoring in favour of shareholders. However, consistent with previous studies (Waweru, Ntui and 
Mangena, 2011; Isa, 2014), the results indicated that an independent board (BCMit) is significant (z-values = 3.44; 
p-values = 0.001) to the firms’ accounting policy decisions. This implies that the central boards have taken over the 
responsibility of monitoring accounting process from the committees. 
 
Stakeholder expectations are found to be significant predictors of the accounting policies decided upon by 
management. For instance, TAXit,(z-values = 2.31; p-values = 0.022), CGSit, (z-values = 5.56; p-values = 0.000) 
and STCit (z-values = 4.52; p-values = 0.000) are significant to the decisions. This supports that firms recognize 
each stakeholder’s expectations based on their implicit claims and merit consideration for its own sake in the 
accounting policy decisions (Donaldson and Preston, 1995), which is consistent with Bowen DuCharme and Shores 
(1995). The traditional predictors of accounting policy choice (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978) are found significant: 
PRTit, (z-values = 1.67; p-values = 0.097) and LEVit (z-values = 1.84; p-values = 0.067) except the political costs 
hypothesis. This is contrary to the view of Ndjetcheu (2012). The bonus plan and the debt covenant hypotheses 
though significant are applicable in different contexts other than for managerial compensations and firms’ risk 
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control. These results imply that the managers’ incentives to accounting policy decisions were derived by the quest 
to maximize shareholders’ wealth, which could be aligned to managerial intentions to secure jobs and reputations.   
 
 Table 4: Regression Summary 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-value Sig. 
Constant 0.4676    0.1223      3.82    0.000 
ACI 0.0316 0.0498      0.63    0.526 
BCM -1.9543   0.5686     -3.44    0.001 
LEV 0.1818   0.0988     1.84    0.067 
FSZ 4.4524     7.1484      0.62    0.534 
PRT -0.1518   0.0912     -1.67    0.097 
LBR -0.0311    0.0242    -1.28    0.201 
TAX 0.0042     0.0018     2.31    0.022 
STC -0.3316    0.0734    -4.52    0.000 
SPL 0.0121    0.0022      5.56    0.000 
Adjusted R2   0.2483 
F-value   11.61 
P-value   0.0000 
  
5. Conclusions 
The study examined the impact of audit committee independence on accounting policy decisions by linking the 
monitoring incentives on the efficiency of the management choice of accounting policy. Fifty-eight listed firms in 
Nigeria were studied for 290 accounting years. Data were collected from the available financial reports of the firms 
and analysed using a model similar to Bowen DuCharme and Shores (1995) and Jackson, Xiaotao and Cecchini 
(2009). The results showed that the firms predominantly used income increasing accounting policies, which include 
cost model and straight-line depreciation method, which implies income increasing strategy. It also discovered that 
a significant number of the audit committees have met up the required number of independent directors as 
prescribed by the 2011 code of corporate governance, which is meant to strengthen their independence for effective 
monitoring. However, this did not ensure effective monitoring of the accounting policies selections. Boards 
monitoring suppressed that of the audit committees because either the committees are not given the required 
authority or they have been passive. This implies that the interests of management and those of the shareholders in 
the selection of the accounting policies are aligned. This brings the oversight of the committees to the limelight 
once again. Thus, the firms setup the audit committees not because they wanted to rely on them for effective 
monitoring but to fulfil the statutory requirement of CAMA 2014 as amended. This conclusion is consistent with 
the view of Menon and Williams (1994). This discovery is contrary to the views of Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) 
and Ndjetcheu (2012): audit process does not ensure effective monitoring on accounting policy decisions. This 
evidence extends the literature of accounting choice in relation to the role of audit process.  
 
These findings have implications for FRCN to reinforce the committees to be effective in monitoring. Although the 
new code, which becomes effective January 2020, requires the committee to be composed mainly of independent 
directors, they would need the required authority to undertake their oversight functions. Members of the committee 
should be required to engage in periodic capacity development and self-assessment for quality control for 
responsible engagement in their monitoring functions. The study makes a major contribution to the accounting 
policy choice literature, as it relates to audit committee independence. Further studies can focus on evaluating the 
authority of the committee and the financial literacy of members in Nigeria.  
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APPENDIX  
. regress apc nlogaci bcms levs szes roa lbr tax stc cgs 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     290 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  9,   280) =   11.61 
       Model |  2.45728023     9  .273031137           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  6.58580781   280  .023520742           R-squared     =  0.2717 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2483 
       Total |  9.04308805   289  .031290962           Root MSE      =  .15336 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         apc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     nlogaci |   .0316011   .0497737     0.63   0.526     -.066377    .1295791 
        bcms |  -1.954275   .5686455    -3.44   0.001    -3.073638    -.834912 
        levs |    .181763   .0988094     1.84   0.067    -.0127406    .3762667 
        szes |   4.452446    7.14841     0.62   0.534    -9.619002    18.52389 
         roa |  -.1518163   .0911783    -1.67   0.097    -.3312983    .0276656 
         lbr |  -.0311059   .0242424    -1.28   0.201    -.0788263    .0166145 
         tax |   .0042398    .001835     2.31   0.022     .0006277    .0078519 
         stc |  -.3315746   .0733767    -4.52   0.000    -.4760146   -.1871347 
         cgs |   .0120814   .0021724     5.56   0.000     .0078051    .0163578 
       _cons |   .4675622   .1223418     3.82   0.000     .2267358    .7083886 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. predict myres, resid 
 
. sktest myres 
 
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
                                                         ------- joint ------ 
    Variable |    Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
       myres |    290      0.1296         0.4383         2.92         0.2327 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of apc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     1.80 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.1792 
 
 
. pwcorr  nlogaci bcms levs szes roa lbr tax stc cgs, sig 
 
             |  nlogaci     bcms     levs     szes      roa      lbr      tax 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
     nlogaci |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
        bcms |   0.2132   1.0000  
             |   0.0003 
             | 
        levs |   0.0275  -0.1421   1.0000  
             |   0.6406   0.0154 
             | 
        szes |   0.4794   0.1541  -0.0559   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0086   0.3425 
             | 
         roa |   0.1009   0.0561  -0.3301   0.2909   1.0000  
             |   0.0863   0.3411   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
         lbr |   0.1070   0.0263  -0.0464   0.0845   0.0830   1.0000  
             |   0.0690   0.6560   0.4315   0.1514   0.1588 
             | 
         tax |   0.2326   0.1503  -0.3510   0.5367   0.6801   0.1315   1.0000  
             |   0.0001   0.0104   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0252 
             | 
         stc |   0.0866  -0.0754   0.5400  -0.0051  -0.3690   0.0547  -0.2728  
             |   0.1412   0.2007   0.0000   0.9311   0.0000   0.3535   0.0000 
             | 
         cgs |   0.0335  -0.0076  -0.0174   0.4778   0.1742  -0.1836   0.2353  
             |   0.5697   0.8969   0.7678   0.0000   0.0029   0.0017   0.0001 
             | 
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             |      stc      cgs 
-------------+------------------ 
         stc |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
         cgs |   0.0144   1.0000  
             |   0.8072 
             | 
 
. estat vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         tax |      2.60    0.384496 
        szes |      2.34    0.426738 
         roa |      2.03    0.491612 
         stc |      1.55    0.644519 
        levs |      1.54    0.648056 
         cgs |      1.50    0.668534 
     nlogaci |      1.44    0.694560 
         lbr |      1.11    0.904941 
        bcms |      1.08    0.922585 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.69 
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